A Risk Assessment of a Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool: Tussles,
  Mitigation Strategies, and Inherent Limits by Faddoul, Marc et al.
 A Risk Assessment of a Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool 
Tussles, Mitigation Strategies, and Inherent Limits 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Marc Faddoul , Henriette Ruhrmann and Joyce Lee 1
School of Information, UC Berkeley 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We perform a risk assessment of the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), a software used in San                               
Francisco and other jurisdictions to assist judges in deciding whether defendants need to be                           
detained before their trial. With a mixed methods approach including stakeholder interviews and                         
the use of theoretical frameworks, we lay out the values at play as pretrial justice is automated.                                 
After identifying value implications of delegating decision making to technology, we articulate                       
benefits and limitations of the PSA solution, as well as suggest mitigation strategies. We then                             
draft the Handoff Tree, a novel algorithmic approach to pretrial justice that accommodates some                           
of the inherent limitations of risk assessment tools by design. The model pairs every prediction                             
with an associated error rate, and hands off the decision to the judge if the uncertainty is too                                   
high. By explicitly stating error rate, the Handoff Tree aims both to limit the impact of predictive                                 
disparity between race and gender, and to prompt judges to be more critical of retention                             
recommendations, given the high rate of false positives they often entail. 
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 BACKGROUND 
The U.S. criminal justice system relies heavily on incarceration, accounting for under 5% of the                             
total world population but over 20% of the total world prison population. The U.S. prison                             
population rate is substantially higher than in many authoritarian countries, for example, twice as                           
high as Iran's and five times higher than China's prison population rate . Pretrial detention is a                               2
major factor driving mass incarceration, as 21.6% of the U.S. prison population are pretrial                           
detainees , contradicting statements from the Supreme Court like “In our society, liberty is the                           3
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” In California,                               4
63% of prisoners in jails have not been convicted or pled guilty, which raises the pretrial                               
detention rate far above that of the rest of the U.S. Moreover, close to a third of felony defendants                                     
arrested are jailed but never found guilty of a crime .  5
 
Addressing the calamitous consequences of unjust pretrial detention is one of few policy issues                           
with bipartisan support. From 2014 to 2015, San Francisco County spent over $3.2 million on                             
jailing defendants who were never charged or whose charges were dropped or dismissed ;                         6
however, California’s above-average pretrial detention rates have not achieved their intended                     
results, as they have been associated with neither fewer defendants not appearing in court nor                             
fewer rearrests . Negative long-term impacts on an individual's professional and personal life in                         7
the criminal justice process are among the many consequences that are worse for defendants                           
held in pretrial detention . Black defendants are also disproportionately affected as the judicial                         8
system propagates racial disparities. Research has found less favorable treatment of black and                         
latino defendants in comparison to white defendants by legal actors throughout the criminal                         
justice process persists, even after controlling for legally relevant factors .  9
 
Many jurisdictions have thus taken action to move toward risk assessment tools to reduce the                             
pretrial detainee population, address judicial bias in detention decisions, or remedy inequities due                         
to monetary release conditions in the cash bail system. Risk assessment tools predict the                           
statistical likelihood of uncertain future events, specifically the likelihood that a defendant will                         
appear in court and not pose a danger to their community, based on information about the                               
defendant. Risk assessment algorithms were intended to make access to pretrial release                       
conditional on predicted risk in an objective process not susceptible to human bias rather than                             
2 ​Roy Walmsley, “World Prison Population List” (World Prison Brief and Institute for Criminal Policy Research, June 11, 2018),                                     
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_12.pdf. 
3 World Prison Brief, ‘United States of America’ http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/united-states-america  
 [accessed 25 November 2018].  
4 Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) 
5 ​Alison Parker, Danielle Haas, and Human Rights Watch (Organization), eds., ​“Not in It for Justice”: How California’s Pretrial 
Detention and Bail System Unfairly Punishes Poor People​ (New York, N.Y.: Human Rights Watch, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/usbail0417_web_0.pdf. 
6 ​Joint Technology Committee, “Using Technology to Improve Pretrial Release Decision-Making,” JTC Resource Bulletin (Conference                             
of State Court Administrators, National Association for Court Management, National Center for State Courts, February 17, 2016),                                 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/files/pdf/about%20us/committees/jtc/jtc%20resource%20bulletins/it%20in%20pretrial%203-25-201
6%20final.ashx. 
7 ​Justin Goss, “Pretrial Risk and Cash Bail,” ​Public Policy Institute of California​ (blog), February 20, 2018, 
https://www.ppic.org/blog/pretrial-risk-cash-bail/. 
8 ​Joint Technology Committee, “Using Technology to Improve Pretrial Release Decision-Making.” 
9 ​Matthew DeMichele et al., “What Do Criminal Justice Professionals Think About Risk Assessment at Pretrial?,” SSRN Scholarly                                   
Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, April 25, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3168490. 
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 wealth, which was intended to benefit low income and minority defendants who were                         
systematically disadvantaged in the prevailing criminal justice process. Such information about                     
the defendant may include both invariable features and dynamic factors that vary over time . At                             10
present, over 60 jurisdictions encompassing 25% of the U.S. population employ pretrial risk                         
assessment tools .  11
 
Yet the use of risk assessment tools is highly controversial because of the risk in replicating                               
biases present in the data used to train the algorithm. Evidence of inherent racial discrimination                             
present in Equivant’s COMPAS risk assessment tool created a foundational case for the field of                             
machine bias . Amid rising concerns regarding unintended societal consequences of algorithmic                     12
systems, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation (LJAF) developed the non-profit Public Safety                         
Assessment (PSA). Used in San Francisco, the PSA was designed to conscientiously avoid                         
machine bias by striving to use "evidence-based, neutral information" and not to rely on "factors                             
such as race, ethnicity or geography" .  13
 
In August 2018, California took the lead in passing Senate Bill 10 (SB10), which abolishes the                               
cash bail system and requires counties to employ a "validated" risk assessment tool. This                           14
formalizes an existing trend: as of 2015, 42 of 46 California counties with pretrial services (91%)                               
already report using such a pretrial risk assessment tool. Most common are the Ohio Risk                             
Assessment System-Pretrial Assessment Tool (ORAS-PAT), used by 38% of counties, and the                       
Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI), used by 36% of counties. Seven counties                         
(15%) use a variety of tools, including COMPAS and PSA. Lastly, four counties (9%) rely on                               
locally-validated risk assessment tools. The remaining five counties offer pretrial services but do                         
not yet use a risk assessment tool . However, the Judicial Council of California, charged through                             15
SB10 with compiling a list of validated pretrial risk assessment tools, expressed concern that                           
only the PSA appears to meet the validation requirements set out in SB10 .  16
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of our study is to analyze the value implications of algorithmic risk assessment                             
tools for pretrial detention, in particular, the PSA, given its projected relevance for pretrial                           
decision making in the wake of SB10. Our analysis seeks to highlight the limits of the PSA in its                                     
current application and discuss possible mitigation strategies to allow for value-based pretrial                       
decisions in California. In terms of scope we limit our analysis to the functional handoff in pretrial                                 
10 ​DeMichele et al., “What Do Criminal Justice Professionals Think About Risk Assessment at Pretrial?” 
11 ​Brandon Buskey and Andrea Woods, “Making Sense of Pretrial Risk Assessments,” ​The Champion​, June 2018, 
https://www.nacdl.org/PretrialRiskAssessment/. 
12 ​Julia Angwin et al., “Machine Bias,” ​ProPublica​, May 23, 2016, 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. 
13 ​Leila Walsh, “Public Safety Assessment: A Risk Tool That Promotes Safety, Equity, and Justice,” ​Laura and John Arnold Foundation                                       
(blog), August 14, 2017, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/public-safety-assessment-risk-tool-promotes-safety-equity-justice/. 
14 "Validation" for the purpose of SB10 means identifying and mitigating any implicit bias. 
15 ​Californians for Safety and Justice and Crime & Justice Institute, “Pretrial Progress: A Survey Of Pretrial Practices And Services In 
California,” August 2015, 20. 
16 ​Tani G Cantil-Sakauye, Martin Hoshino, and Cory T Jasperson, “Senate Bill 10 (Hertzberg),  as Amended March 27, 2017 –  Letter 
of Concern Addressed to Assembly Member Jones-Sawyer,” 2017, 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ga-position-letter-assembly-sb10-hertzberg.pdf. 
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 detention decisions from cash bail system pre-SB10 to a risk assessment-based system                       
post-SB10 in California. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Our methodology combines theoretical and empirical approaches to addressing our research                     
objective. In an iterative process, we reviewed existing literature, conducted five expert and                         
stakeholder interviews, and applied two theoretical frameworks considering the value                   
implications of technological change. While many academics have addressed the question                     
whether pretrial risk assessment tools lead to more favorable outcomes for defendants, literature                         
on the opinions of stakeholders within the criminal justice system is less accessible. Researchers                           
investigating the PSA on behalf of the LJAF have surveyed criminal justice professionals –                           
including pretrial services staff, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders – to address this gap .  17
 
Our ​expert and stakeholder interviews allow us to augment these insights with qualitative data                           
and include more perspectives. In addition to discussing the practical reality of pretrial risk                           
assessment with the San Francisco Deputy Public Defender who provided a sample PSA court                           18
report (see Appendix 1), our team interviewed a UC Berkeley and Dartmouth professor of                           
Computer Science researching algorithmic risk assessment , and the Criminal Justice and Drug                       19
Policy Director of the ACLU of California . Furthermore, we were particularly interested in                         20
understanding how the individuals most affected by the technology, criminal defendants, view                       
the functional handoff. For this reason we interviewed two previously convicted individuals and                         
conducted a card-sorting activity to elicit which information would be most relevant to accurately                           
predict whether a defendant appears in court or reoffends. The card-sorting activity firstly                         
prompted interviewees to identify information types based on their personal experience, before                       
presenting information types currently being used in pretrial decision making processes, either as                         
a PSA factor or in other regions of the world (Appendix 2). Our approach mirrored the LJAF's                                 
survey research and complements the study's findings with insights from underrepresented                     21
stakeholders.  
 
Finally, we structured our findings and analysis with the help of ​theoretical frameworks​, the                           
handoff model developed by Mulligan and Nissenbaum and the Ethical OS toolkit developed by                           22
the Institute for the Future and the Omidyar Network . We chose to employ the handoff model                               23
because the observed trend towards algorithmic risk assessments is an example of the                         
redistribution of functionality for which the handoff model can provide systematic insights with                         
regard to the values in play before and after task delegation. Furthermore, the Ethical OS toolkit                               
17 ​DeMichele et al., “What Do Criminal Justice Professionals Think About Risk Assessment at Pretrial?” 
18 ​Chesa Boudin, Interview with the Deputy Public Defender of the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office, December 2, 2018. 
19 ​Hany Farid, Interview with Professor for Computer Science, Dartmouth College and UC Berkeley, November 2, 2018. 
20 ​Margaret Dooley-Sammuli, Interview with the Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Director at the ACLU of California, November 16,                                     
2018. 
21 ​DeMichele et al., “What Do Criminal Justice Professionals Think About Risk Assessment at Pretrial?” 
22 ​Mulligan and Nissenbaum, “Reasoning about the Values Implications of Reconfiguring Sociotechnical Entanglements: The Handoff                             
Model.” 
23 ​Institute for the Future and Omidyar Network, “Ethical OS - A Guide to Anticipating the Future Impact of Today’s Technology,”                                         
2018, https://ethicalos.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ethical-OS-Toolkit-2.pdf. 
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 allowed us to assume a future-oriented perspective and draw on our critical insights to devise                             
targeted mitigation strategies to address value conflicts in the future. 
 
 
Figure 1: Results of card-sorting activities analyzing information sources. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Handoff Model 
A "handoff" is a situation where a task or function is "shifted out" or delegated from one actor to                                     
another. Mulligan and Nissenbaum's framework contributes a cross-disciplinary analytical tool to                     
map the values implications of a handoff. In our analysis, we apply the handoff model to two                                 
distinct handoff configurations (HC) in California pretrial decision-making before and after the                       
enactment of SB10 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Handoff Configurations before and after SB10 
HC-A: Before SB10  HC-B: After SB10 
The judge decides whether to detain or 
release a defendant with or without 
conditions before the trial without algorithmic 
assistance. 
The judge has the evaluation of the PSA 
available when deciding pretrial detention or 
release. 
 
The ​system for the purpose of our analysis is the judicial pretrial decision-making process at the                               
level of the court, represented by the judge, and, in the case of HC-B, the risk assessment                                 
algorithm. The ​trigger for jurisdictions such as California to move from a non-technological                         
pretrial decision-making process (HC-A) to algorithmic assistance (HC-B) may encompass two                     
sets of factors: the availability of risk assessment algorithms and growing public frustration with                           
extensive pretrial detention and inequitable access to pretrial release for financially insecure and                         
minority defendants. The development of the COMPAS tool started in 1998 and was used                           
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 outside a pilot project for the first time in 2010 , while the LJAF began developing the PSA in                                   24
2013 and the tool has been in use in some jurisdictions as early as 2014 .  25
 
I. Goal 
The system's ​goal ​under both handoff configurations is to ensure the defendant appears in court                             
for their trial and does not pose a danger to their community for the duration of the criminal                                   
justice process. In achieving this dual goal, the system must satisfy the constraint of limiting                             
unnecessary incarceration.  
 
II. Purpose 
The ​purpose of pursuing this goal, ie. why the system seeks to achieve the goal, is to maintain                                   
public order and safety. Ensuring that a defendant appears in court is necessary for the                             
defendant to receive fair treatment under the law, which includes a fair trial and if the defendant                                 
is convicted of a crime an appropriate sentence to maintain public order. Moreover, if an                             
apprehended defendant poses a danger to the public, for example, because they threatened a                           
witness in their case, it may be necessary to detain the defendant in the interest of public safety.                                   
The purpose of the constraint related to minimizing unwarranted incarceration is – at an                           
individual level – to respect the defendant's presumption of innocence and limit restricting their                           
liberty and – at a societal level – to avoid the human and financial cost of extensive incarceration.  
 
III. Function 
In pretrial detention decisions, the ​function of the system is to assess all available information                             
about the defendant and their case, to evaluate their risk of failing to appear in court and                                 
committing a crime that poses danger to their community. Based on predicted risk, the system                             
must reach a decision whether to detain or release the defendant, with or without additional                             
monetary or non-monetary conditions, for example, a GPS-monitoring device. 
 
IV. How 
Both HCs discussed differ in ​how the system performs the function of assessing all available to                               
predict a defendant's risk profile and reach a pretrial release or detention decision. The                           
introduction of a risk assessment tool explicitly hands-off one aspect of the judge’s decision to                             
the algorithm: a numerical risk assessment. 
 
HC-A: Values Implications  
The values inherent in HC-A reflect a high degree of agency both for the judge and the                                 
defendant. The judge enjoys full discretion and ​autonomy over the elements of the                         
decision-making process and which part of the actual mental decision-making to publicly                       
disclose to the defendant. Therefore, the judge is only constrained by the letter of the law and a                                   
possible legal challenge by the defendant. The fact that a judge can and will take into account  
 
24 ​Angwin et al., “Machine Bias.” 
25 ​Laura and John Arnold Foundation, “About the PSA,” accessed November 26, 2018, https://psapretrial.org/. 
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 Table 2:  Analysis of Actors in Handoff Configurations A and B  
HC-A: Before SB10  HC-B: After SB10 
- The ​human actor (judge) has         
information on the defendant at an           
individual level and about similar         
defendants, cases, and their outcomes         
at an aggregate level, based on their             
subjective professional experience. The       
judge can take into account quantitative           
and qualitative information .  26
- The ​human actor ​(judge) defines which           
information is relevant and how it should             
be weighed. The judge may choose an             
intuitive or systematic approach (​mode​),         
for example, by applying a mental risk             
model. The judge is not required to             
distinguish between the independent       
goals of ensuring that a defendant           
appears in court and reducing the risk             
from future criminal activity to the public. 
- The ​human actor ​(judge) arrives at a             
two-part decision: deciding whether to         
detain or release and whether to attach             
monetary (bail) or non-monetary (eg.         
electronic monitoring or abstinence from         
alcohol) conditions to a release, which           
the judge justifies to the defendant and             
their legal council. 
- The ​technical actor (PSA) requires         
information deemed relevant to be         
entered into the system. 
- Human actors (court staff) manually         
enter information on nine distinct         27
factors (​mode​) in the form of binary             
yes/no (eg. does the defendant have a             
prior conviction) or numeric inputs (eg.           
the defendant’s age at current arrest) .  28
- The ​technical actor (PSA) calculates         
three risks scores to predict whether a             29
defendant will commit new criminal         
activity (NCA), commit new violent         
criminal activity (NVCA), or fail to appear             
in court (FTA) . The PSA is explicitly             30
oriented towards either goal because         
the algorithm is trained on appearance           
data or on recidivism data . Each of the               31
raw risk scores is converted to a             
six-point scale for the NCA and FTA             
scores and a flag, which it displays to               
the judge. 
- The ​human actor (judge) has the same             
information available as under HC-A,         
the scores, and interpretation guidelines         
to make and justify the decision  
26 The presence of the defendant’s family, friends, or caseworker is considered “extremely” or “very” important in the decision to                                       
release or detain the defendant pretrial by 18% of judges. ​DeMichele et al.​ (2018) 
27 ​Manual data entry by a human actor is subject to intentional or unintentional human error and has in the past led inaccurate risk                                               
evaluations, for example, in the prominent case of a murder committed in San Francisco by a defendant assessed to be low risk who                                             
was released on bail. ​Lagos​ (2017) 
28 ​Interview with ​Margaret ​Dooley-Sammuli, the Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Director at the ACLU of California. 
29 Each of the three scores is based on a combination of four to seven of nine factors: age at current arrest, current violent offense,                                                 
pending charges, prior misdemeanor conviction, prior felony conviction, prior violent conviction, prior failure to appear in past two                                   
years, prior failure to appear older than two years, and prior sentence to incarceration. 
30 ​Laura and John Arnold Foundation​ (2016) 
31 The LJAF discloses whether each factor impacts the risk positively or negatively and that "each of these factors is weighted—or,                                         
assigned points—according to the strength of the relationship between the factor and the specific pretrial outcome." The "strength of                                     
the relationship" between a given factor and one of the three risk outcomes was extrapolated from a dataset of observed outcomes in                                           
1.5 million cases from 300 U.S. jurisdictions. The weights applied to each factor based on the model provided are numeric and range                                           
from 0 to 4 but mostly are binary pairs of 0 and 1 for yes/no-type factors. The process of calculating the three risk scores based on a                                                     
prescribed formula by combining and weighting the information entered for each of the nine factors is deterministic in that the risk                                         
score output is fully determined by the data inputs and a set of static weights. 
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 qualitative information about the defendant's presentation illustrates the societal consensus that                     
such information adds value to the decision. Bail schedules promote ​efficiency in the                         
decision-making process and create a baseline for judges across courtrooms that anchors                       
their decision on the conditions of release even as they retain full autonomy over the                             
decision. To the degree that judges as human actors psychologically respond to                       
anchoring, bail schedules contribute to harmonizing release conditions, which promotes                   
fairness across courtrooms. However, a uniform bail schedule based on the charged                       
offense creates a disadvantage for lower-income defendants because a nominally                   
uniform bail amount impacts defendants charged with the same offense differently based                       
on their income.  
 
 
Moreover, the judges’ autonomy in the decision-making process negatively impacts minority                     
defendants, especially if their minority group is statistically more strongly associated with crime.                         
In theory, the defendant is nevertheless provided with the judge's justification, which creates                         
transparency ​and gives the defendant the opportunity to clarify misunderstandings and to                       
challenge the judge's decision. Such transparency and space for communication between the                       
judge and the defendant makes the judicial process ​accessible for the defendant and allows                           
them to understand the process and exercise their rights. Furthermore, the decision-making                       
process is also accessible to an appellate court and can be subjected to judicial ​review if there                                 
are concerns with regard to the quality of the decision. Finally, the judge is fully ​accountable for                                 
every aspect of the decision-making process, both de jure and in public perception.  
 
HC-B: A Shift in Values at Play 
HC-B implies a shift in the values in play. The judge no longer has ​autonomy over which                                 
information enters the decision-making process because the nine risk factors that are evaluated                         
in the PSA will factor into the decision. In the LJAF's survey, 80% of judges reported that the PSA                                     
“always” or “often” informs their release decision . While it is possible for the judge to depart                               32
from the risk assessment, some jurisdictions have intentionally made such departures more                       
procedurally costly, for example, by requiring the judge to state their reasons on the record .                             33
SB10 in earlier versions while amended by the Assembly included the provision that "if a judge                               
or magistrate’s release decision is not consistent with the pretrial services program’s risk                         
assessment and recommendations on conditions of release, the judge or magistrate shall include                         
in its order for release a statement of the reasons" (SB10, Section 17, §1275(c)(2017)) .  34
 
Notably, this provision is not part of the final version of the bill as approved by Governor Brown:                                   
requiring a risk assessment tool as part of the decision-making process demonstrates societal                         
values in prioritizing quantifiable quantitative information based on aggregated statistical data                     
over qualitative information from the judge's professional experience. It is therefore not surprising                         
that among legal actors interacting with the risk assessment tool, judges (33%) are most likely to                               
32 ​DeMichele et al., “What Do Criminal Justice Professionals Think About Risk Assessment at Pretrial?” 
33 ​Harvard Law Review Note, “Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing,” ​Harvard Law Review                                     
131 (2018 2017): 1125. 
34 ​California State Legislature, “Senate Bill No. 10 (SB-10) Pretrial Release or Detention: Pretrial Services,” Pub. L. No. 10 (2018),                                       
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB10. 
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 consider the relative loss of judicial discretion a weakness of the system although both                           
prosecutors (29%) and public defenders (25%) shared their concern . Moreover, the process                       35
values ​efficiency as the input data is easy to collect and does not require interviewing the                               
defendant. Risk assessment scores can then be calculated within split seconds, and in                         
combination with the policymakers' guidance on the interpretation of risk scores provide a clear                           
decision recommendation to the judge.  
 
However, it is doubtful that HC-B can achieve its objective to promote ​fairness over the                             
non-technological approach in HC-A. Even if race or income are not included in the PSA input                               
parameters, 'prior misdemeanor conviction' or 'prior failure to appear' reflect societal and judicial                         
biases against certain groups. The predictions of the PSA are therefore directly influenced by                           
historical and present biases, just like judges can be. Rather than enhancing transparency​, risk                           
assessment tools often add obscurity to the decision-making process. Even though the LJAF                         
stands out in its commitment to disclosing the risk factors and weights that the algorithm is                               
based on, they do not disclose detailed information on the base dataset or the necessary                             
subjective design choices in selecting seemingly simplistic integer weights to make the PSA                         
easily describable. For example, an obvious case of a subjective design choice is the threshold                             
effect created by the '’under 23 years old' penalty. For a defendant arrested one day before their                                 
23rd birthday the NCA risk score is two points (out of a total of seven points) higher than if the                                       
same defendant had been arrested three days later.  
 
This inconsistency is a result of a conscious choice to situate the PSA on a continuum between                                 
interpretability and ​accuracy​. In other words, by thriving to fulfill public-facing values such as                           
transparency and ​accessibility​, the accuracy of the model was sacrificed. Nevertheless, the lack                         
of transparent information on the model generation makes it more difficult to challenge a judge's                             
decision following a risk assessment recommendation in judicial ​review​. Finally, the public                       
reaction to the case of the San Francisco murder on risk assessment recommended pretrial                           
release illustrates that while the judge is still de jure ​accountable for the decision, public                             
perception holds the technical actor responsible for adverse outcomes. 
 
Ethical OS Toolkit 
The Ethical OS Toolkit features three tools to guide technologists toward “anticipating the future                           
impact of today’s technology (or: how to not regret the things you will build).” We began our                                 36
analysis by contemplating scenario six of the first tool, which happens to mirror the topic of this                                 
report: the adoption of “predictive justice” tools to determine prison sentences (Table 2).  
 
Following this, we applied “The Risk Mitigation Manual,” examining questions posed of risk zone                           
four (machine ethics and algorithmic biases). The last two questions were particularly resonant:                         
“How will you push back against a blind preference for automation (the assumption that                           
AI-based systems and decisions are correct and don’t need to be verified or audited)?” and ​“Are                               
35 ​DeMichele et al., “What Do Criminal Justice Professionals Think About Risk Assessment at Pretrial?” 
36 ​Institute for the Future and Omidyar Network, “Ethical OS - A Guide to Anticipating the Future Impact of Today’s Technology.” 
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 your algorithms transparent to the people impacted by them? Is there any recourse for people                             
who feel they have been incorrectly or unfairly assessed?” ​Our interview with a representative                           
from the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office confirmed the former concern, highlighting how                         
judges follow “do not release” PSA recommendations in over 90% percent of cases. Furthermore,                           
he suggested that within the jurisdiction of San Francisco, legal counsel of current defendants                           
have access to PSA recommendations; however, the degree to which they are explained to                           
defendants likely varies on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Table 2: Contemplating Scenario 6 of the First Ethical OS Tool 
What is your greatest worry in this 
scenario? 
Systemic injustice is perpetuated, social 
change is impossible, and norms are inverted, 
shifting toward “guilty until proven innocent”  
How might different users be affected 
differently by this future? 
Certain individuals and communities that are 
overpoliced are more negatively affected, 
either inadvertently or intentionally  
What actions would you take to safeguard 
privacy, truth, democracy, mental health, 
civic discourse, equality of opportunity, 
economic stability, or public safety? 
Prevent automation of decision making 
processes by requiring justification of 
decisions made, make records of such 
decisions and justifications publicly available   
What could we be doing now to get ready 
for this risky future? 
Shape regulatory mechanisms (technology, 
law, market forces, social norms)  37
accordingly: require regular algorithmic audits, 
implement support better training for judges, 
incentivize transparency to align with 
business objectives, promote social 
accountability and opportunities for 
contestability  
 
Examining the final future-proofing tool, we dwelled in the possibility of strategy three (Ethical                           
Bounty Hunters); however, it would require transparency of datasets and algorithmic inner                       
workings to be viable. As a result, we turned to strategy two, A Hippocratic Oath for Data                                 
Workers, which features Data for Democracy’s Global Data Ethics Pledge (GDEP). We                       38
imagined the oath being taken by algorithm designers in courts of law, committing to the five                               
principles of fairness, openness, reliability, trust, and social benefit, before presenting algorithms                       
in regular audits for public scrutiny. Despite its forward-looking framing, the toolkit’s emphasis on                           
avoiding regrettable mistakes is noteworthy; indeed, after examining each tool within the context                         
of algorithmic risk assessment, we found that the framework aims to prevent repetition of past                             
mistakes more so than foster truly out-of-the-box speculation. 
37 ​Lawrence Lessig, “Chapter 7 - What Things Regulate,” in ​Code​, Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
38 Data for Democracy, "Global Data Ethics Pledge (GDEP)." 2017. https://github.com/Data4Democracy/ethics-resources 
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DISCUSSION 
Building up on the insights gathered from existing literature, analytical frameworks, and                       
stakeholder interviews, the following section highlights both benefits and limitations to the PSA,                         
as well as possible mitigations. We expand the discussion to consider a few broader                           
considerations of algorithmic risk assessment, before proposing an alternative design, the                     
Handoff Tree Model, to address identified constraints. 
 
PSA Benefits and Limitations 
We acknowledge that the PSA solution was built in good faith with the intention to diminish                               
unnecessary pretrial incarceration. Compared to other tools, it does indeed offer a few benefits.                           
The PSA uses data that is easy to collect and is thus easy to implement, not requiring the                                   
defendant to be interviewed. This contributes to making it a cost-effective solution and avoids                           
introducing personal biases of the interviewer in an interview with the defendant. Moreover, our                           
interview with the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office confirmed that more people are being                           
released within San Francisco – both at pre-arraignment and early stage – as a result of using the                                   
PSA.  
 
Unlike Northpointe's COMPAS tool, the PSA also breaks down the risk scores to make the                             
weight of each variable explicit, and it separates three types of risks – failure to appear (FTA),                                 
new criminal activity (NCA), and new violent criminal activity (NVCA). Furthermore, the tool                         
intends to rely on data that limits the impact of structural biases against minorities. Variables                             
such as postal code, income, or juvenile convictions that are highly correlated to race are not                               
included. Even if this does not make the tool immune to bias as suggested by LJAF, the PSA                                   
seems to be essentially calibrated between races and gender. Calibration means that for a given                             
risk score, there is a similar chance of FTA, NCA, or NVCA if the defendant is released,                                 
independently of the race. Offered a dataset from Kentucky courts by the LJAF, researchers’                           
assessments found that PSA is relatively well calibrated between white and black defendants,                         
showing minimized predictive biases for two of the three risk scores. Nonetheless, design                         39
choices made by the LJAF challenge several values, including ​fairness​, ​transparency​, ​precision​,                       
and ​empirical accuracy​.  
 
Inherent Disparities Are Not Explicitly Addressed 
Given that some racial groups have more prior charges, all subject matter experts interviewed                           
expressed the problematic nature of using flawed historic data to create a model such as the                               
PSA. Effective calibration means that for a given risk score, there is a similar chance of FTA (or                                   
NCA, NVCA) if the defendant is released, independently of the race. ​While meaning well,                           
calibration efforts do not remove predictive bias​: because the average number of defendant                         
who fail to appear or recidivate (base rates) are different across races and genders, there is an                                 
39 The exception is for low-risk black defendants, whose failure to appear (FTA) rate tends to be underestimated. 
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 inherent mathematical tradeoff between calibration and error-rate balance. This is confirmed by                       40
the aforementioned analysis of the PSA done with the Kentucky dataset, which found ​“the FTA                             
scale to be significantly more predictive for white defendants (ROC = 0.655) than black                           
defendants (ROC = 0.612).” ProPublica and others’ critiques of the COMPAS tool also thus                           41
apply to the PSA: a well intended black defendant is more likely to be predicted as high risk than                                     
a equally well intended white defendant (essentially, a higher false positive rate for black people).                             
The same phenomenon occurs between genders for the NVCA score, making the PSA harsher                           
for women.  
 
Predictive disparity across race and gender is inherent and needs to be explicitly addressed;                           
however, the LJAF fails to state how the trade-off between error-rate and calibration is handled.                             
The stance for calibration was only inferred from the Kentucky dataset, which was picked by                             
LJAF. Without a fairness proposition, there is no guarantee that the PSA will remain calibrated                             
over an extensive dataset. Moreover, it is an intentional choice from the LJAF not to include race                                 
in the prediction, but some research argues that blinding the algorithm to race and other                             
protected variables only detracts from fairness metrics. On the contrary, ​including race or                         42
gender allows to reach optimal precision both within groups and overall. These theoretical                         43
results concur with the PSA Kentucky analysis, which found that including the 'race' variable                           
would add predictive utility. Unfortunately, politicians are reluctant to accept distinctions by                       44
race or gender despite the statistical benefit. Treatment disparity is often illegal and always a                             45
sensitive topic.  
 
Mitigations. ​Approaches to enhance fairness would thus be for the LJAF to state an explicit                             
fairness proposition regarding racial and gender bias. This might include adjusting the PSA to                           
include race and gender in jurisdictions where it is legal, and take position in favor of treatment                                 
disparity to increase predictive utility. 
 
The PSA’s Underlying Statistical Model is Opaque 
Without transparent judicial processes, the state cannot be held accountable for fairly enforcing                         
the rule of law. ​Paradoxically, despite the fact that the LJAF supports “a deliberately transparent                             
approach” , ​neither the data nor the model used to infer the weights and features of the                               46
model are public. ​Since the LJAF made the choice to only include input parameters that cannot                               
be tampered with by the defendant or the prosecutor (see Appendix 2 for PSA factors), this                               
40 ​Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Manish Raghavan, “Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores,”                                 
ArXiv:1609.05807 [Cs, Stat]​, September 19, 2016, http://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807. 
41 ​Matthew DeMichele et al., “The Public Safety Assessment: A Re-Validation and Assessment of Predictive Utility and Differential                                   
Prediction by Race and Gender in Kentucky,” ​SSRN Electronic Journal​, 2018, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168452. 
42 ​Jon Kleinberg et al., “Algorithmic Fairness,” ​AEA Papers and Proceedings​ 108 (2018): 22–27, 
https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181018. 
43 ​Zachary C. Lipton, Alexandra Chouldechova, and Julian McAuley, “Does Mitigating ML’s Impact Disparity Require Treatment                               
Disparity?,” ​ArXiv:1711.07076 [Cs, Stat]​, November 19, 2017, http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.07076. 
44 ​DeMichele et al., “The Public Safety Assessment.” 
45 The SB-10 bill is in contradiction with statistical evidence, as it requires risk assessment tools to be 'equally accurate’ across gender                                           
or race, but prohibits the use of these variables. Though the bill can still be changed, and these constraints are state dependant. The                                             
Wisconsin supreme court has authorised gender-specific risk assessment tools in a 2016 ruling. 
46 "Pretrial Justice - Laura and John Arnold Foundation." http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice/.                   
Accessed 9 Dec. 2018. 
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 proprietary opacity cannot be justified with an intention to protect the tool from being outsmarted                             
by the actors who use it. As suggested by our conversation with the San Francisco Public                               
Defender’s Office, this deliberate information retention is likely a way for the LJAF to protect their                               
solution from competitors and to limit exposure to criticism. It is rather concerning that market                             
regulation principles such as trade secrets are preferred over accountability and transparency of                         
the judicial system. 
 
Another key challenge with the PSA’s opacity is that there is no clarity for how recommendations                               
are made. In PSA-generated court reports, for instance, judges are offered the input data, the                             
resulting NCA and FTA scores, and a table to get the final recommendation (see Appendix 1).                               
The connection from raw scores to recommendations is not transparent, which prevents judges                         
and – often policymakers at large – from understanding the PSA, generating a misunderstanding                           
of algorithmic capabilities. Opacity in the functional logic of the tool contributes to the “artificial                             
intelligence” mythology that overstates the power of prediction tools. As our interview from the                           
ACLU articulated, ​“[Computerized] risk assessment sounds like a silver bullet, but there’s a lot of                             
education to do.”  
 
Mitigations. ​A key improvement to improve transparency would be to publish the underlying                         
statistical model that was used to generate the weights associated with each input variable, as                             
well as the methodology used to clean the data and generate the training labels. Anonymised                             
subsets of the training data should also be ideally included to better enable accountability.                           
Furthermore, providing a clear justification for how risks scores are converted into the                         
recommendation matrix would making the model more understandable for all the actors involved. 
 
The PSA Model is Too Simplistic, Reducing Reality’s Complexity  
The PSA limits its model to a sum of binary variables to reduce complexity. It seems that the                                   
approach is aimed at increasing the interpretability of the decisions, but it results in an overly                               
simplistic model. Firstly, this creates ​arbitrary threshold effects​: for instance, a defendant                       
suddenly loses two (out of 13 raw risk points) on the NCA score as they turn 23 years old.                                     
Secondly, summing up risk factors also implicitly assumes that they correspond to independent                         
phenomenons and that there are ​no cross-variable effects​. This is a debatable hypothesis, as                           
there most likely are interactions between age and prior convictions. Thirdly, a fundamental                         
aspect of empirical science is to include error rates and confidence intervals. The PSA includes no                               
considerations regarding the confidence of the results​, despite the fact that it cannot be                           
identical for all defendants. For instance, one can intuitively notice that the precision of the model                               
will be lower for defendants close to 23 years old because of the threshold effect described                               
above. In sum, the over-simplification of the PSA formula leads to aberrations and potential blind                             
spots without providing feedback on the precision. 
 
Mitigations. ​To avoid arbitrary penalties for defendants as a result of the model's lack of nuance,                               
mitigation strategies may include smoothing empirically irrelevant threshold effects, providing                   
confidence intervals, and accounting for interactions between key variables by explicitly including                       
or controlling for them in the model. 
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Use of "Red Flags" Countervails Empirical Evidence 
The PSA has a feature called “step-two exclusions”: these are overrides that lead to systematic                             
“do not release” recommendations. By default (as a a result of LJAF’s reasoning), a murder                             
charge is one such “red flag,” but counties also have the capacity to implement their own                               
step-two exclusions, as we learned by way of our interview with San Francisco Public                           
Defender’s Office. These flags are often introduced based on human intuition and societal                         
preference; however, is not the point of risk assessment tools is to challenge human intuition                             
with empirical evidence? ​The tool should be made to pick up on overlooked phenomena: for                             
instance, that in the case of a spousal homicide the murderer is often not a risk to the rest of                                       
society, or that many may defendants are actually innocent – a common problem when using                             
charges as an input. Moreover, judges are well able to enforce a systematic exclusion by                             
themselves without a built-in override through the PSA. There is no value in using a machine to                                 
perform a trivial flagging task based on charges. Charges are not currently included in the input. If                                 
specific charges need to be part of the formula, it should be done in a empirical way rather than                                     
hard-coding human judgements, which undermines the whole predictive entreprise.  
 
Mitigations. ​We question the nature of step two exclusions – we intended to speak with the                               
LJAF about this decision, though they did not return for comment. Without further context, we                             
suggest the removal of step-two exclusions altogether, or at least the removal of the ability to                               
create more automatic overrides: our ideal alternative would be to provide an empirical risk score,                             
and leave to the judge his agency and autonomy to override the risk score, if necessary. We                                 
elaborate further on this in our discussion of the Handoff Tree Model design. 
 
Broader Algorithmic Risk Assessment Considerations 
 
Prediction Accuracy in Pretrial  
The PSA’s overall predictive utility is about 64%, a level that matches other algorithms like                             
COMPAS . This can sound decent at face value; however, some perspective on this figure may                             47
be helpful. A 64% precision is equivalent to saying that if we randomly pick one released                               
defendant that appeared to court and one released defendant that failed to appear, the PSA                             
algorithm would have attributed a higher score to the latter 64% of the time. This is just 14%                                   
better than flipping a coin. A recent experiment gives another interesting point of comparison.                           
Participants with no judicial expertise were asked to guess whether a defendant would recidivate                           
based on the same input variables that the COMPAS algorithm uses. They had a median                             
accuracy of 64% where the COMPAS algorithm yields 65.2%. Are risk assessment tools really                           48
introducing valuable insights? 
 
47 ​DeMichele et al., “The Public Safety Assessment.” 
48 ​Julia Dressel and Hany Farid, “The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism,” ​Science Advances 4, no. 1 (January                                       
2018): eaao5580, https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aao5580. 
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 Notably, the base rate for recidivism within that dataset was 46%, which means that the                             
algorithm did much better than a 54% baseline one could reach by trivially guessing “no                             
recidivism” all the time. For failure to appear, the base rate is 14.8% in the Kentucky dataset. ​This                                   
means that the PSA algorithm would be vastly outperformed by an '’algorithm'’ that would                           
recommend release all the time, which would achieve 85% accuracy. ​The Kentucky dataset                         
includes defendants who have been released, but for whom the PSA algorithm would have given                             
a “retain” recommendation. The empirical offense rates for these high risk profiles are outlined in                             
Table 3. In other words, if a defendant is classified as 'retain' for having a FTA score of 5, there is                                         
empirically a 75% chance that they will NOT fail to appear. ​For new violent criminal activity,                               
this false positive rate goes up to 97%​. Do the misbehaviors of the remaining 3-4% justify the                                 
mass incarceration of the rest of these defendants?  
 
Table 3: Empirical Offense Rates of High-Risk Profiles (According to the PSA)  49
PSA Risk Score (out of 6)  5   6  
Failure To Appear  26%  32% 
New Criminal Activity  20%  26% 
New Violent Criminal Activity  3%  4% 
 
We concede that this dataset is limited to Kentucky, and that we only have data on defendants                                 
for whom the counterfactual is available, which are defendants who have been released. Even if                             
this may not be perfect, we trust LJAF for having provided a dataset that is roughly                               
representative of reality. Therefore, even if the exact percentage may vary, the order of                           
magnitude should be correct. The quality of the dataset provides the same credit to these base                               
rate estimations than to the fact that the PSA is well calibrated regarding race. Even if the base                                   
rate were to be 6% instead of 3%, the table shows that for optimal precision, all defendants                                 
should be released all the time. Prediction tools, including PSA, legitimise the fact that for every 4                                 
prisoners sent to jail for FTA risk of 5, only one would have defected and the other 3 are purging                                       
unnecessary pre-trial sentences. 
 
The Logistical Difficulties of Qualitative Information 
The PSA’s emphasis on being efficient means that it prioritizes data that is easy to collect.                               
However, during our card-sorting exercises with formerly incarcerated individuals, research                   
participants and their lived experience identified primarily qualitative information sources as                     
being useful to making risk assessments (see Figure 1). A few of these include psychiatric                             
evaluation (via the Global Assessment of Functioning Scale), number and quality of relationships,                         
as well as length of potential sentence – with longer sentences leading to riskier behavior,                             
mirroring projections of prospect theory. The only unprompted information source that mirrored                       50
49 Re-crunching of the data presented in ​DeMichele et al., “The Public Safety Assessment.”​, Table 20, 21 and 22. 
50 Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” ​Econometrica​, vol. 47, no. 2, 1979,                                       
pp. 263–291. ​JSTOR​, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1914185. 
 
16 of 26 
 the PSA risk factors was age, which one of the participants did identify. Many of the qualitative                                 
information would only be accessible by a face-to-face interview or other forms of investigation.                           
However, not only does this require resources, but it may also introduce bias which the                             
algorithmic risk assessment tools were intended to alleviate. 
  
This tradeoff is particularly notable when attempting to understand whether a failure to appear in                             
court is intentional or unintentional, as relevant information often cannot be efficiently gathered.                         
“There’s a big difference between flight risk (e.g. someone running away to Mexico) vs. failure to                               
appear risk (so, say if I’m homeless and I don’t have a calendar or phone),” one of our interview                                     
subjects explained. “[Algorithmic] tools don’t distinguish between those. If ‘runaway to Mexico’                       
risk is very hard to manage; that’s a very different situation from someone who is ‘high risk’ of                                   
failure to appear because they had no one remind them, give them bus tokens, etc. The tool                                 
conflates these risks, some of which can be easily mitigated.” A number of external                           
circumstances can affect whether or not someone who fails to appear in court, but                           
understanding any defendant’s intentions faces challenges of not only gathering such qualitative                       
data, but also incorporating it the algorithm, as a question of efficiency and practicality. 
 
ALTERNATIVE DESIGN SUGGESTION: THE HANDOFF TREE MODEL 
Given the aforementioned PSA limitations and broader considerations, we suggest an alternative                       
algorithm design. It does not significantly increase the precision, as the low base rate and high                               
uncertainty are inherent. However, the core idea is that ​the algorithm only makes a prediction                             
when the confidence is high enough​; when it is not, the decision is handed off to the judge. It is                                       
a process of ​intelligent delegation, in which ​the algorithm calls upon the critical judgement of                             
the judge when it is most needed, preventing blind deference to algorithmic recommendation.  
 
Benefits of such a design include diminishing the error-rate, ​as the algorithm will not make                             
excessively noisy predictions. ​Predictions are always bundled with an error rate​, to precise                         
what is meant by 'high' or 'very low' risk and increase the interpretability of the tool. Moreover, by                                   
making the false negative rate apparent, a dimension of valence is added to the predictions                             
which ​addresses the predictive disparity across races and genders. Furthermore, the tree                       
approach offers greater accountability in that the combination of factors that led to a prediction                             
are trackable and can be debated. 
 
Prediction Process of the Handoff Tree 
A decision tree is an intuitive, yet powerful model. Unlike the PSA model, a decision tree makes                                 
no assumption of linearity and captures the interactions between the risk factors. Decision trees                           
are widely used for their ability to integrate large heterogeneous datasets while minimizing the                           
loss of relevant signal.  
 
To derive a prediction, a series of questions is asked about the defendant. Let us consider a toy                                   
example with only two variables: we want to predict the risk of failure to appear based on the                                   
age and the number of prior failures to appear of a defendant (see Figure 2). The blue circles (Os)                                     
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 correspond to defendants who have been released and came to court, while the red crosses (Xs)                               
are defendants who failed to appear. This graph represents the training set, or knowledge base                             
of the algorithm. Running a decision tree algorithm will divide the cloud of Xs and Os into clusters                                   
– represented by the colored rectangles, each of which corresponds to a prediction label.  
 
 
Figure 2: Representation of the Handoff Tree on the training dataset. 
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Figure 3: Representation of the Handoff Tree decision process 
 
The algorithm follows an ordered list of questions, derived by the training dataset: for instance, Is                               
the defendant older than 33, or older than 60? Do they have more than one failure to appear on                                     
their record, or more than three failures to appear? With each question, the profile of the                               
defendant takes form, enabling the algorithm to curate a list of similar defendants from the                             
training dataset, to whom it may compare the defendant in question. This list, or cluster,                             
corresponds to the colored rectangles on Figure 3. 
 
Some clusters are very well defined: for instance, almost all defendants between 33 and 60 who                               
had never failed to appear before did show up to trial. In these regions of the graph, the algorithm                                     
can give a prediction with a strong confidence. On other parts of the graph, however, the training                                 
set shows much more uncertainty. For instance, for defendants under 33 with a single prior                             
failure to appear, there is no strong majority in the training set. Instead of giving an average risk,                                   
the algorithm hands off decision to the judge, who can leverage contextual elements to                           
refine the prediction. The judge is more properly suited to investigate, asking the defendant why                             
they failed to appear the first time and assessing if the cause can be mitigated. 
 
A key design consideration is that ​the model only gives an empirically-based risk prediction,                           
without any recommendations​, a contrast to the PSA’s approach, which goes beyond risk                         
assessment to also make recommendations. This is an improvement as it eliminates decision                         
making on data that has only a low statistical confidence. To address the low base rate of FTA                                   
and NCA which causes high rates of false positives, we explicitly state error rates associated                             
with each prediction. The handoff tree allows to report confidence easily, by simply taking the                             
ratio of positive to negative points in a given cluster. For instance, in the “High Risk” cluster of                                   
defendants with 4+ prior failures to appear, the false positive rate is 60%. In the “Very Low Risk”                                   
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 cluster of individuals under age 33 with no prior failures to appear, the false negative rate is 13%.                                   
We hope that these rates will inform the judge’s decisions, by systematically reflecting the fact                             
that high risk predictions often correspond to an empirical risk far below 50%.  
 
Lastly, ​making the false negative rate apparent is a way to address the problem of                             
discriminatory bias. As described in the discussion on fairness and calibration, the core of the                             
problem is that for the tool to be calibrated, black defendants have higher false positive rates                               
than white defendants: to address this, the error rate will add a notion of valence to every                                 
prediction. ​Black defendants might still be more often classified as “high risk” than their                           
white peers, but the higher error rates will make the strength of these prediction weaker. If                               
judges integrate these rates in their decisions, this strategy could concretely mitigate the                         
discriminatory biases relative to the impossibility of simultaneously accommodating fairness of                     
treatment and fairness of impact.  
 
Values Implications in Designing the Handoff Tree 
Code is law, or, as Winner puts it, “artifacts have politics” . Indeed, the technical choices made                               51
during the design of the model entail strong value implications. The handoff tree model is no                               
exception to this position: the choice of the training set and its features as well as the value of                                     
several hyper-parameter will reflect political or ethical judgements. 
 
Shaping the Training Set and its Features 
First we would like to highlight that ​only defendants who have been released can be used as                                 
training data. For defendants who were put in jail, there is no counterfactual: we don't know                               
what they would have done if they had been released. Therefore, they can't be used as training                                 
data. We assume that the PSA adopted this approach, but we did not find an explicit statement                                 
that confirms it. Another important design choice is whether race and gender should be                           
integrated in the feature set. As stated mentioned above in the discussion about fairness and                             
calibration, we believe that the predictive signal introduced by these highly relevant variables is                           
valuable to reduce predictive disparity and increase accuracy. As much as it is legally possible,                             
we argue that ​it is beneficial to account for gender and race while clearly stating the fairness                                 
proposition that support the use of these protected variables. 
 
Another consideration regards the number of prediction tasks the model should include. The PSA                           
has three, separating the risk of failure to appear, the risk of commiting a crime before the trial                                   
and the risk of committing a violent crime. This is a wise choice, but another important distinction                                 
is lacking, as suggested by several of our interviewees: ​is it a risk of ​intentional or unintentional                                 
failure to appear​? ​Indeed, it seems that many defendants fail to appear because of                           
transportation problems or conflicts with professional or personal constraints. Unlike for                     
defendants who are trying to flee, the appropriate treatment for a high risk of unintentional failure                               
to appear is not incarceration. Instead, one would want to find ways to have the defendant                               
51 Winner, Langdon. "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 1, Modern Technology: Problem or Opportunity? (Winter,                                   
1980), pp. 121-136 The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences. 
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 commit to coming to court or to accommodate material constraints. It seems that providing a bus                               
ticket could sometimes save months in jail. 
 
The problem with that approach is that constituting a training set that would distinguish between                             
intentional and unintentional FTA would require a significant amount of investigative work. Then,                         
one would want to identify features that can be collected easily and that predict the FTA                               
intentionality well enough. For instance, “accessibility of the court by public transportation” or                         
“date of trial during work hours of the defendant” could be relevant criteria. Discrimination                           
between intentional or unintentional FTA could be done both on the PSA model and on the                               
handoff model. It is not low-hanging fruit, requiring a substantial amount of work both to design                               
and implement the process. Nonetheless, we believe it is worth exploring as this change could                             
substantially alleviate unnecessary incarceration. 
 
Setting Thresholds and Other Hyperparameters  
The hand-off tree is a generic model, and there are several hyperparameters that will impact the                               
behavior of the algorithm in practice. The first parameter is ​the precision threshold below which                             
the algorithm will delegate the decision to the judge. Since the low base rate for FTA and                                 
crimes before trial make the classification asymmetrical, there are two primary thresholds to set:                           
(1) the minimal false positive rate in order to classify a defendant as “high risk,” and (2) the                                   
minimal false negative rate in order to classify a defendant as “very low risk.” Choosing these                               
values will impact how much jurisdiction the algorithm takes upon itself. Most importantly, it ​will                             
define the extent to which our society accepts to put well-intended defendants in jail in                             
order to reduce FTA and pretrial crime rates.  
 
Another needed specification regards ​how the clusters are defined during the training phase.                         
For instance, do we want to also consider defendants that are aged 28 when we are predicting                                 
the risk of a 22-year-old defendant? Or would it be better to restrict the inference to a cluster of                                     
defendants in the age range 18-26? The bigger the clusters are, the less treatment disparity                             
there is between defendants. In general, it will make the predictions safer, but less precise. When                               
the cluster size is reduced, the predictions become more relevant as we compare defendants that                             
are more alike. The downside of this is that as the sample size diminishes, the model becomes                                 
more prone to doing undue extrapolations. Choosing an excessively small cluster size would                         
correspond to what is called ​overfitting the model. Picking the optimal cluster size depends on                             
the size and quality of the training-set. This optimisation is an intricate statistical problem                           
involving  trade-offs between:  
 
- the ​confidence​ and ​precision ​of predictions 
- the ​computational complexity of the model (especially relevant if using the later                       
discussed forest extension of the handoff tree) 
- data confidentiality​, or the degree to which the training set can be inferred from the                             
model 
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 Formalizing how these technical constraints can be translated into their implications regarding                       
judicial values would require further work. Furthermore, even after having set the cluster size and                             
all other hyperparameters, several cluster configurations may yield results equally satisfying from                       
a statistical point of view. Another design choice with technical implications comes up: ​are there                             
features that are more appropriate to discriminate against than others? For instance, if both                           
split yield equivalent results, it is better to split according to age or according to the number of                                   
prior convictions? This can be important regarding the ​interpretability of the result. The impact                           
of prior FTA may be more relevant than age when it comes to debating the prediction made by                                   
the tool in the light of the defendant's individual context. Therefore, one could define a rule to                                 
prompt the algorithm to split preferably along certain features than other. At the aggregate level,                             
nothing would change, but for individual defendants, the choice of the cluster split could have a                               
significant impact on outcomes. 
 
Choosing the “right” split can seem like a quite subjective yet consequential decision. We would                             
thus like to briefly introduce ​the Handoff Forest, an extension of the model that would                             
significantly reduce this design subjectivity. Since there usually are many different trees that                         
look equivalent at the aggregate level, a classic strategy to blur the artificial differences between                             
these models is to use a forest, or a group of trees, combining the different predictions in a final                                     
result. It would soften arbitrary threshold effects that an individual located near the border of a                               
cluster would face with a single tree. This approach also ​systematically increases accuracy on                           
new data​, and reduces the risk of overfitting. The forest approach would make the model slightly                               
less accountable, as the prediction would no longer be the result of a single combination of                               
features. Nonetheless, it will still be possible to give the weight that each variable or combination                               
of variable had on the outcome. Another addressable but non-trivial problem is to to optimally                             
combine error rates from the different trees, requiring further work to understand how best to                             
train models to maximise various value objectives.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this report, we first presented a background on state-wide risk assessment tool use, then                             
outlined an analysis of value implications for algorithmic pretrial detention. Informed by a mixed                           
methods research approach, we conclude that while the PSA is a well-intentioned improvement                         
on existing tools, there are multiple areas in which the tool could better support values inherent                               
to human-based decision making: these include addressing inherent disparities, making the                     
model more transparent and less reductionist, as well as exercising caution when building in                           
automatic overrides. Given the very high error rates that pretrial risk assessments entail, we                           
believe that the recommendations must be considered with more critical judgement than they                         
currently are. Significant choices were made during the PSA design to extrapolate variable                         
weights from the training data, which we argue are not sufficiently available to the public,                             
missing sufficient translation of technical language into value tradeoffs that are more easily                         
understood by relevant stakeholders. 
 
 
22 of 26 
 We thus offer mitigations that may improve the PSA’s implementation, as well as a completely                             
alternative design, the Handoff Tree. This model offers a paradigm shift in that it intelligently and                               
fully delegates decision making to the judge when uncertainty is too high. Considerations about                           
error rates are made an integral part of the prediction reports, which provide nuance and                             
interpretability on what a “high risk” recommendation means, as well as attempting to directly                           
mitigate predictive discrimination. Precision and robustness can also be increased by extending                       
the tree to a forest, though requiring reductions in accountability and interpretability. The design                           
of such a model involves intricate trade-offs, which could lead one to question the value of such                                 
an alternative. However, such tussles are inherent to data science, and the way they are                             
addressed is what makes a model accurate and fair.  
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 APPENDIX 
 
1. Sample PSA Court Report 
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2. Information Sources Presented in Card-Sorting Activities 
PSA Factors  - Age at current arrest 
- Current violent offense 
- Pending charge at the time of the offense 
- Prior misdemeanor conviction 
- Prior felony conviction 
- Prior conviction (misdemeanor or felony) 
- Prior violent conviction 
- Prior failure to appear in the past two years 
- Prior failure to appear older than two years 
- Prior sentence to incarceration 
Assessments  - Judge's assessment 
- Defendant's self-assessment 
- Defendant's family's assessment 
- Assessment by fellow citizens (jury of 
peers) 
- Victim's assessment 
Personal Characteristics  - Gender 
- Race 
Personal Situation  - Relationship status 
- Number of dependants 
- Obligations to care for loved ones 
- Employed 
- Number of months employed 
- Stable housing 
- Number of months in stable housing 
- Health conditions 
- Financial situation 
Preparedness for Flight  - Preparations for traveling outside the 
country (eg. passport, tickets) 
- Contacts outside the country 
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